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TAXATION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE ENERGY "CRISIS"
GERARD M. BRANNON*

The issues of tax policy in the energy "crisis" make up a political
problem of some subtlety. The battle of who shares the gains and
losses (on domestic oil and natural gas) generated by the international market has continued for four and one half years, and still
seems far from solution.1 This article examines these issues as a
problem of public choice, a matter of both politics and economics.
SOME PRELIMINARIES
As an economic problem of allocation of resources, the so-called
energy crisis presents no overwhelming mystery, even though there
are uncertain elements. Given the fact of a high price for imported
oil, which is out of the United States' control, it follows that the
efficient policy for the United States is to increase the output of
domestic energy resources until their marginal cost is equal to the
cost of equivalent oil imports, and to reduce oil consumption until
its marginal utility rises to the cost of imports.2 Since both the
demand and supply of oil and oil substitutes is price inelastic in the
short run, a period of continued high, but falling, imports is the
economic solution.
A great deal, but not all, of an efficient solution for allocating
energy resources could be achieved by simply letting markets work,
which means that the market prices for energy resources would rise
sharply in the U.S. The nub of the political "crisis" of energy policy
is that most Americans would see this price rise as imposing "excessive" burdens on consumers and generating "excessive" windfalls for
many energy producers and resource owners.
The public choice problem we focus on is how much to use
*Dr. Brannon is a Professor of Economics at Georgetown University.
1. As of this writing, May 1978, the House-Senate Conferees have not agreed on an
energy bill. I do not expect their compromise to be the ultimate solution.
2. "Marginal Utility" is a convenient way to refer to consumer satisfaction from using
oil. We could substitute "until consumers are indifferent at the margin between using more
oil, using an oil substitute or not using so much energy." The only economic assumption
involved is that as consumers use less oil, the marginal amount consumed becomes more
valuable relative to the alternatives and at some point it will be efficient to import high cost

foreign oil.
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market mechanisms to bring about basic adjustment to the current
world oil market. Posing the problem this way does not present a
claim that the market for energy resources is efficient in all respects,
but only that very specific market defects call for specific remedies.
The following are market defects and their corresponding specific
remedies:
(1) The market price of imports does not make provisions for the
special security costs involved in dependence on imports subject
to boycott. This problem calls for a reserve inventory financed
by an import tax and a still higher market price.
(2) The market price of imports does not reflect that heavy imports
affect our exchange rate and impose a further burden on Americans. Consequently, a still higher import price is necessary.
(3) Most energy alternatives to oil involve environmental and health
hazards that are not internalized in costs. Internalizing the externalities would require some pollution taxes and/or regulations
which further increase the cost of alternative fuels.
(4) An optimum amount of research and development is not likely
to be undertaken in private markets because much of the
benefits of successful research and development (R&D) is captured by others than the investor. Subsidized research is necessary.
These uncertain elements are serious, and much work needs to be
done to quantify and solve the problems of imports, pollution, safety
and research.
However important, these externality problems are separable from
the central energy policy problem that this paper addresses-the extent to which we use the market system, by means of transferring
real income, to deal with the basic tasks of (1) reducing U.S. consumption of oil and energy, and (2) increasing U.S. production of oil
and oil substitutes. The problems of specific market defects can be
handled whether we rely on market prices or government controls to
deal with these basic tasks. Thus, we will largely put these specialized
problems to the side and concentrate on the politics and economics
of using a market solution to the problem of the increased price of
oil imports.
THE POLICY RANGE
Since the increase in world oil prices of 1973-1974 the U.S. has
been engaged in public and legislative debates about oil price control
and various taxes on the production and use of oil. Since the 1950's,
we have had a national debate on the regulation of the field price of
natural gas. During the last few years there has been a flurry of
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activity in some states over the imposition of increased severance
taxes on coal and uranium. These issues have a common core: they
are concerned with the transfer of income away from producers and
owners of energy resources.
Three consecutive Presidents have proposed changing the pricecontrol tax on oil to a more specific windfall tax. The difference is
hardly crucial to producers. A specific tax deprives producers of
actual revenue; price control deprives producers of potential
3
revenue.
The unique difference between price control and windfall taxes is
that the effective "tax" under price control is immediately "spent"
by the government as a consumer subsidy. Each consumer benefits
from maximum price control in proportion to his or her consumption. Cadillac drivers benefit far more from gasoline price control
than do bus riders. Windfall tax revenues, on the other hand, can be
distributed to the public to compensate for the price increase on
some average consumption basis. Alternatively, the proceeds could
be spent by the government on the public's behalf. The obvious third
alternative policy is to do nothing; let consumers face market prices,
and make this income available to producers. 4
Both the windfall tax and the price control form of tax will necessarily change producer incentives. Any output and reinvestment
incentives that would have come from market prices are lost, and
there may be new incentives inadvertently created to do things that
reduce or avoid taxes. In addition, the price control, through its
consumer subsidy feature, will change consumer incentives.
These incentive distortions must be regarded as bad. Typically,
governments try to supplement policies of capturing producer surplus with a variety of regulations or other tax incentives to reinduce
the behavior that is discouraged by taxing income away from producers and subsidizing consumption.'
Briefly, the policy alternatives are as follows:
(1) free market prices (externality corrected), or
(2) free market prices plus special producer taxes ("windfall" taxes)
(a) with specific distribution of the proceeds to the public,
and/or
3. On the claim that the economic regulation issue is really about allocation of income,
see Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, BELL J. ECON. MANAGEMENT SCI. 2:3
(1971) and Pelzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, J. L. ECON. 19:211
(1976).
4. Recall that externality problems are being left aside.
5. For a discussion of these problems of incentives in relation to energy policy, see
articles by Wright, Mead, Brannon, Penmer, Bryer and Drapkin, GROWTH AND CHANGE
(Jan. 1979).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

(b) with other incentives or regulations to induce desired producer behavior, or,
(3) price control with or without other incentives and regulations to
induce desired producer and consumer behavior.
These policies of transferring producer surplus are not novel.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the present issue of basic energy policy
existed in exactly the opposite form to that of 1973-1974. Two
decades ago the world price of oil was low and national policy, which
consisted of an import quota, a lower income tax on crude oil production via percentage depletion and the deduction of intangibles,
and national support for state prorationing, was concerned with
diverting a potential consumer surplus into higher income for producers. This policy could also be described as shifting a negative
producer surplus to consumers.
The same income redistribution issues underline the argument of a
military draft vs. an all volunteer armed force. It is irrelevant to pose
the question, "Is a drafted army better than an all volunteer army?"
The answer to that question is that if we pay enough for a volunteer
army, it can attract the same soldiers that we would have drafted. To
achieve this parity, of course, we would have to set the pay levels and
the acceptance qualifications high, especially for new entrants.
The present political talk about going back to a draft is largely a
response to earlier claims that a volunteer army would save money.
The evidence is now clear that for an equal quality army, the short
run cost of volunteers is much higher than the cost of draftees.
Economically, the draft is a way of enforcing price control on military service.
The military draft issue is like the issue of oil price control. In one
case we don't want the oil companies to exploit energy customers. In
the other case we flabby, middle-aged Americans do not want young
people to exploit the market for defense.
The assumption of this paper is that the issue of taxes in the
energy program is not merely a matter of populist pique at rich oil
companies but a manifestation of a very general social problem of a
change in income distribution which is perceived as non-functional
(i.e., undeserved). Some deeper understanding of the tax issues in
energy policy can be achieved by looking at them in relation to this
social (i.e., political) problem of income transfer.
THE SIMPLE OPPOSITION OF PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS

At root, the energy policy options involve a political contest between producers and consumers. The outcome of such a contest is
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simply indeterminate. Consumers far outnumber producers; therefore consumer interests have an initial edge in any democratic policy.
On a per-capita basis, however, producers would have high gains from
a market price policy without windfall taxes. Consequently, it is
possible that the producer interest can prevail by means of logrolling.
Legislators representing producer interests will trade their votes on
other issues that are not of much concern to their constituency.
Legislators whose districts cover only energy consumers will observe
that the gain to any consumer from price control will be small.
Therefore, an anti-consumer vote on this issue might not be remembered when these legislators go back to their districts for re-election.
Legislators who represent consumers might profit from trading away
proconsumer votes on energy issues in order to get support on other
topics that are of greater concern to their constituency. 6
The foregoing argument does not predict that energy producers
will prevail by means of logrolling, only that this development might
overcome the numerical advantage of consumers. In energy policy
the record is mixed. In the 1950's and 1960's the producer interests
succeeded in obtaining import quotas and low taxes for oil and gas
companies, but they were unable to prevent natural gas price regulation.
A commentary on the close balance between the legislative power
of producer and consumer interests was offered by the income tax
changes with regard to percentage depletion that was debated in the
Congress in 1974 and 1975.1 The facts were that the drastic reduction in percentage depletion was not enacted until 1975, and favorable depletion was preserved for medium-sized oil and gas producers
as well as for producers of other minerals. The inference is that it was
only the massive size of the oil price increase that tipped the balance
against the producer interests.
The device that brought about a change in the law in 1975 was a
compromise that protected the interests of medium-sized independent drillers by limiting percentage depletion to about $4,000,000 to
$6,000,000 of receipts. 8 This provision has very little to do with
6. Another discussion of this producer-consumer conflict which suggests a number of
nrcumstances in which consumers should win, see Buchanan and Tideman, Gasoline Rationing and Market Pricing: Public Choice in Political Democracy, Center to Study Public
Choice, VPI Blacksburg, Virginia, (research paper, Jan. 1974).
7. Morrison, Energy Tax Legislation; the Failure of the 93d Congress, 1 2 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 369 (1975).
8. Bennett and Heath, Tax Reduction Act Severely Cuts Depletion Allowance, Tax
'redit on Foreign Operations, 42 J. TAX. 337. Also McDonald, The Taxation System and
Warket Distortion in R. KALTER & W. VOGLEY, ENERGY SUPPLY AND GOVERNWENT POLICY (1976).
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output incentives since a nonintegrated producer whose receipts are
already at this level would get no tax benefit on marginal output. In
price terms, assuming a 48% tax rate and a net value of the percentage depletion deduction of 15%, this gross allowance is equivalent to
a $0.75 price increase for lower tier oil and an increase of $1.70 for
upper tier oil. For a taxpayer in the 70 percent bracket who might be
regarded as an influential constituent in an oil district, the real price
equivalent of this percentage depletion allowance is about $1.85 for
lower tier and $4.00 for upper tier.9
A similar pattern can be seen in the provision in the price control
system for crude oil to treat stripper wells as producing upper tier
(high priced) oil.' 0 From an efficiency standpoint, this must be
overall counter-productive (compared to other ways of dealing with
pumping costs). Under the price control arrangement a producer can
substantially increase income from a low yield well by reducing output to bring it within the definition of stripper (10 bbls a day).'
One reason price control on oil has survived is that a very numerous
body of potential opponents have been bought off.
The benefits in both of these provisions go to groups that would
make up part of the producer lobby. Those benefits serve to reduce
the willingness of producers to provide the intense political support
necessary to logroll their position over the far more numerous consumer interests.
A further complication in the producer-consumer politics of oil is
that independent refiners and distributors have an interest in preserving price control. From the standpoint of the independents,
increased crude oil prices would mean increased profits for integrated
companies with the prospect that profits on crude would be available
to improve their competitive position in refining and distribution.' 2
By 1978 it has been widely reported that the mechanics of price
control, especially the complex arrangements for rolling-in prices ol
9. We assume that the net benefit of 22% percentage depletion is 15% for lower tier oil,
the reduction accounted for by the net income limitation, the cost depletion foregone and
the minimum tax. See Brannon, The Present Tax and Subsidy Provisions Relating to the
Energy Industries in STUDIES IN ENERGY TAX POLICY (G. Brannon, ed., 1974). See alsc
McDonald supra, note 7. For upper tier oil, the net income limitation will be less restrictive
so we put the value of percentage depletion at 18%.
10. Mead, Oil, an Unregulated Industry, in ENERGY SUPPLY AND PUBLIC POLICY
155 (1976).
11. Renshaw, The Taxation of Crude Oil, Gasoline, Related Fuels and Commodities such
as Motor Vehicles, GROWTH AND CHANGE (Jan. 1979) (forthcoming).
12. See M. WOOLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGE: NATURAL
GAS AND PETROLEUM (1976). There is a discussion of industry structure at 111-119 anc
a number of references to measures to protect independents in Chapter 6.
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high and low cost resources for refiners and distributors, including
imported gasoline, have produced a pump price of gasoline which is
more nearly consistent with the world crude price than the U.S.
crude price. These circumstances provide a further group of producers who are willing to support the consumer side of price control
politics.
On the face of things, producers and consumers have different
kinds of strength in the political conflict over income redistribution-intensity of interest versus sheer numbers. Because of the
ability of redistribution schemes to isolate subgroups of producers,
the outcome of this conflict must be regarded as indeterminate.
THE OUTPUT PENALTY
Our public choice approach to the treatment of energy incomes
makes the basic assumption that decision makers respond to the self
interested views expressed to them by their constituents. This assumption appears to leave little room for government policy to be
directly affected by considerations of economic efficiency, a topic so
prominent in economic analyses of the energy crisis.
A useful way to integrate economic efficiency questions within
the political context of the present discussion is to refer to the
output penalty. In any situation in which an industry enjoying a
windfall price increase exhibits a high level of price elasticity of
supply, an attempt to capture the windfall profits, either by price
control or by special taxes, will reduce output substantially. This
reduction is an output penalty. In this way, the tax creates an excess
burden over and above the burden of income transferred from producers to consumers.
A significant excess burden is likely to fall on labor as increased
unemployment. Where the labor group involved is organized, there
will be opposition to the price control from a constituent of the
federated labor union organization. This opposition will make it difficult for the central labor organization to support the consumer
interest. In U.S. politics, support of organized labor is an important
condition for success of consumer-oriented causes.
So far as the energy price issue is concerned, there is debate about
the size of the output penalty. Ostensibly, the two tier price control
system leaves a strong inducement to new well drilling, but impairs
incentives with regard to old wells. Where there are multiple owners
of property interests in one nonunified oil pool, existing owners
would not likely risk loss of ultimate recovery by deferring output.
In the aggregate, however, we can only say that there has been some
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loss in ouptut of old oil.' " The loss, however, is less than would
appear from lowered production figures because oil left in the
ground can be extracted later. 1 4 A relevant observation is that the
output penalty does not diminish existing jobs, and it would be
unlikely to trigger much labor opposition to a tax on producer incomes.
Consumers can influence the political decision regarding output
penalty. A shortage that was obviously induced by regulation would
generate considerable demand for decontrol. There is no shortage of
oil involved since an indefinite supply of foreign oil is available at
some price. Consumers generally do not give as much notice to oil
prices as they do to oil shortages since the energy resource component of energy service prices is quite small.
A detailed look at how the output penalty has entered the political debate in natural gas is revealing as to the oil situation. On some
obvious grounds, 1978 is a most unusual year for repeal of natural
gas price regulation. On the political side, the consumer-oriented
interests were stronger than they had been in most Congresses since
field price regulation began, and the Administration was in favor of
continued price control. At the same time, massive increases in field
prices had already occurred under price control; the Carter energy
program was providing a controlled price for natural gas almost six
times higher than the field price that prevailed in the U.S. in the
1960's! Why, under these circumstances, has it been so difficult
politically for the Administration to get a continuation of price control on natural gas?
With only slight facetiousness, I suggest the explanation of the
cold winter of 1977. Consumers have been made increasingly aware
of the output penalty through a cumulation of effects from unsatisfied demand, restriction on new installations of gas home-heat,
unemployment from interruptions of industrial service, and finally,
the restriction on the availability of heating gas during an exceptionally cold winter.
It has taken almost 15 years for the output penalty involved in
natural gas price regulation to assume sufficient importance to
change the balance of forces in the politics of the producer-consumer
13. Rostow, Fisher and Woodson, National Energy Policy, Sept. 1977 An Interim Overview, in COUNCIL ON ENERGY RESOURCES, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: A CONTINUING ASSESSMENT (1978).
14. Renshaw, supra. A qualitative assessment which seems to express a greater concern
with the output penalty is provided by Russell, ENERGY IN THE 1978 BUDGET SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES (J. Pechman, ed., 1978). See also the comment on Renshaw's paper by Geo. VonFurstenburg, GROWTH AND CHANGE (Jan. 1979) (forthcoming).
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opposition. Understandably, the far more subtle penalty associated
with price control on oil (which is merely excessive imports) is unlikely to have a significant impact on consumers.
POLITICAL AWARENESS
The next ingredient of a public choice analysis of the treatment of
windfall profits on energy resources can be identified as the general
public awareness of the issue, which really means the state of consumer awareness. It is useful to distinguish windfall profits from the
output penalty that we just discussed. The separation of these two
topics facilitates concentration on states of mind and general expectations as distinct from actual observed consequences. It has been
recognized in the literature that one source of strength on the producer side of the conflict is the large per capita benefits to producers
from policies of decontrol with no windfall taxes; producers can
spend money to change the public awareness of the issue.' '
What has happened in the matter of the profits underlying the
energy crisis illustrates the extreme complexity of this issue awareness. While producer outlays on advertising will have significant
effects at the margin, there appears to be a broad variety of almost
accidental circumstances that chahge the state of awareness.
In the matter of natural gas price regulation, the succession of
historical accidents is amazing. The regulation of field prices grew
out of a Supreme Court interpretation of highly ambiguous statutory
language.' 6 What was certain to be a Congressional override of the
decision was frustrated by a fortuitous scandal involving allegations
of an improper offer to one Senator.' ' Since the public enjoys reading about scandals more than about economics, this raising of awareness led directly to the long reign of natural gas price control, in the
face of powerful economic arguments against this price control (i.e.,
that the control reduced the royalty income, not a monopoly profit
and created a shortage).
The significant publicity factor in the energy crisis of 1974 was
the fortuitous oil embargo that directed public attention to the
energy problem in a unique way due to long waiting lines at gasoline
stations. Also of some importance was the fact that a price control
mechanism left over from President Nixon's New Economic Policy of
1971 already existed. Of the two circumstances, the preexisting price
15. Peltzman, supra.
16. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
17. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973).
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control was undoubtedly the less important. The announcement of a
major international political event, an embargo against the U.S. at
the beginning of the winter heating season, immediately set the
media to talking about how the suddenly limited supplies would be
allocated. The serious health implications of heating oil shortages,
even on a local basis, would seem to make inevitable a public demand
for a nonprice allocation system.
If further consciousness raising were necessary, it was provided by
the identification of large U.S. oil companies with the governments
in several key OPEC countries and the resulting persistence of conspiracy theories about the whole oil crisis. There is undoubtedly
some general good will in the American public for a market-price
argument. The relevance of adopting a domestically free price as a
response to a foreign cartel beyond our control is a somewhat subtle
point, however. With a widespread suspicion that our oil companies
were somehow involved in the foreign cartel, the chances of dislodging a price control system already in place were very slight.
The awareness issue was very clear in 1975. President Ford's administration, whose sympathies might be presumed to rest on the
side of market prices and production incentives, proposed merely the
substitution of an explicit windfall tax with distribution of the
proceeds in lieu of a price-control tax. The proposal was defeated by
a populist demand for crude price control.' I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF REGULATION

In assessing the potential gains to consumers from either a price
control or a tax approach to dealing with a producer surplus, the cost
of enforcing a redistribution system is potentially an offset to those
consumer gains. This argument is similar to the point about economic efficiency in that we would not expect to find a strong constituency for efficiency in government expenditures as such. The
public choice significance of this feature will depend on its absolute
size, as well as precisely how the administrative costs are reflected in
the policy decision.
In the present case, for a number of reasons, there were in existence a number of oil and oil products reporting systems plus a
reasonably small number of refineries. The entire regulatory system
has been handled at an administrative cost of under $0.5 billion on
the government side.' 9 Even if these costs were subtracted from the
18. For review of this legislative battle, see Brannon, Prices and Incomes: The Dilemma
of Energy Policy, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 445 (1976).
19. Russell, supra at 330, referring to the results of an inter-agency study.

October 1978]

TAXATION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

proceeds of a producer tax, this would make a very small dent in the
size of excess profits.
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CARTER ENERGY-TAX
PROGRAM FOR OIL
The central feature of the Carter energy tax program as it relates
to oil is the crude oil equalization tax (COET). In political terms a
proposal more or less like this one should be regarded as inevitable.
Oil price control was extended by the 94th Congress (1975) with its
principal support from President Carter's party, and that party was in
stronger control of the 95th Congress than it was of the 94th.
Impressively, the opposition to COET in the Ways and Means
Committee was a combination of the 12 Republicans voting plus the
Democrats from the oil producing states of Texas (2), Louisiana, and
Oklahoma. The measure carried by 21-16.2o Clearly the opposition
was not a vote for price control but for ultimate decontrol with gain
accruing to energy producers and owners of energy resources. This
inference is strengthened by the appearance of exactly the same
line-up (with yeas and nays reversed) on an amendment to allow oil
companies to keep 20 percent of the COET revenues for investment
in finding more oil.2
The President had brought around the non-oil-state Committee
Democrats (many of whom had been price control supporters in
1975) to the position of allowing consumers to face the import price
of oil with regard to their marginal decisions.2 2 The President had
certainly moved his constituency to a more economically defensible
position. It would have been quite unrealistic to have expected a
Democratic President to completely abandon his own constituency
to advocate no price control and no windfall tax.
The COET was keyed to the import price of oil which meant that
it involved two important economic problems. The import externality problems noted in our introduction remained, and there was
some output penalty.
Although we have argued that the output penalty was not potent
politically, it will be useful to look a bit more closely at COET to see
how it deals with output issues. The tax would move the U.S. crude
oil price to the world price level by 1980 with the reservation that
the U.S. price might not be permitted to rise fully to the world price
20. TAX NOTES, June 20, 1977, at 3.
21. Id.
22. An exception to this proposition is noted infra at note 24.
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if that price after 1977 rises by much more than the rate of U.S.
price inflation, now an unlikely possibility.
COET would recapture "windfalls" by applying different tax rates
to different oil types. Different types of oil are defined as follows:
(1) old oil, as defined by the pre-1977 price regulations, broadly oil
produced from a field not in excess of the production in 1973;
(2) new oil, which does not fall in any of the other categories;
(3) new-new oil-oil discovered from wells drilled after April 20,
1977 (at a minimum distance from old wells on shore or from
old leases off-shore) plus oil obtained from existing wells by
tertiary recovery methods;
(4) stripper oil-from wells with output below 10 bbl/day;
(5) Alaskan oil and oil from the Naval Petroleum Reserves.
COET would be defined as the market price less an allowed factor
price. The factor prices for old oil and new oil are the 1977 regulated
prices, $5.28/bbl and $11.56/bbl respectively, increased annually for
general inflation. The factor price for new-new and stripper oil would
be the 1977 world market price, $14.25, also increased for inflation.
Table 1 provides some calculations of the COET for 1980 assuming
that the world market price for oil rises at 5 percent or 7 percent a
year while the U.S. prices increase about 5 percent a year.
Table I illustrates the division between producers and consumers of
the increased market cost of raising the crude oil prices. We have
simply assumed a plausible level of U.S. outputs for 1980; our intention is not to predict a particular output response, but to look at the
financial implications of a plausible output.
An OPEC price, rising at the U.S. inflation rate, should be about
$16.50 in 1980, delivered East Coast, U.S. (1980 case #1). If U.S.
production is 3.56 billion bbls, this will create a market cost of $58.8
billion in 1980. Under price controls in 1977, Americans paid $25.7
billion for crude produced in the U.S. To get a fair picture of the
cost to U.S. consumers of the higher prices, we include in the 1977
cost the value of an amount of oil that was imported in 1977 but will
be produced in the U.S. in 1980, the quantity X in Table 1. (U.S.
consumers will pay for other imports in 1977 and 1980 but these are
irrelevant to the immediate focus of U.S. product.)
For an amount of crude oil for which Americans are now paying
$34.5 billion (the $25.7 billion noted supra plus $8.8 billion of
imports) the cost in 1980 at the market price will be about $60
billion, a few billion more or less depending on the OPEC price. If we
assume 5 percent inflation, the U.S. consumers should expect the
current cost to rise to $40 billion by 1980 with no increase in real
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burden. The net increase in burden on U.S. consumers is then $19-2:
billion. Under the proposed windfall tax, the federal governmeni
captures $12-15 billion, leaving $7 billion to producers, along witt,
approximately $9 billion that U.S. producers set for displacing some
imports. This is a gross increase in U.S. producer real income of $16
billion. One obvious qualification to the producer income is that the
1980 production includes an increase of 0.51 bbl of Alaskan production, which entails special costs of almost $4 billion (transportation
at $6/bbl and Alaskan Tax of about $1.25/bbl). These special costs
reduce the net increase in producer income to $11 billion.
To relate this to output changes we must consider the normal
decline rate in old wells. Putting aside the new-new and Alaskan oil
in 1977, the remaining production is 2.7 billion bbls.; in three years
this should decline normally by about 0.6 billion bbls. To produce a
net output gain of 0.6 billion bbls, the total new production must be
around 1.2 billion bbls. As proposed, the COET drives a hard bargain
with producers. Even if producers achieve an appreciable output increase, the gain to the companies per barrel of increased output is
only about $10.
This much windfall tax would appear to be "buying" considerable
output penalty. Some recognition of this situation was shown by
newspaper reports of proposed regulation changes wherein oil producers would be offered substantial increased revenues. 2 3 The techniques of driving the Congress to a strong anti-producer position that
is to be modified later by administrative action seems to create an
inept political operation. Basically, it seems clear that the details of
COET can be modified to achieve more producer income.
However these output aspects of COET might be handled, the
externality problems related to high imports remain. It is not inconceivable that the Carter administration could have advanced a price
solution-an import tax plus correspondingly higher taxes on U.S.
producers and higher distributions to consumers. Considering the
price control forces to be dealt with, it is not surprising that this
avenue was not pursued.
Since the externality problems remained, the questions were how
non-price adjustments would be allocated between classes of consumers, and whether the adjustments would be brought about by
regulation, tax penalties, or tax incentives. (Although there was no
constituency for further restrictions on oil consumption, we think an
administration must anticipate that continuation of economically
23. Washington Post, April 15, 1978, at 1.
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unsound positions in this case, increasing oil imports, will generate a
future political liability.)
With regard to the first part of this remaining problem of allocating more energy reductions, we can infer from the administration
proposals and from Congressional reaction, a priority scale which was
approximately as follows, starting with the most favored group:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

users of home heating (non-electric)
users of petro-chemicals
users of residential and commercial heating (non-electric)
auto drivers and agricultural users
public utilities
industrial users (of oil) not convertible to coal
industrial users, convertible to coal.

The Ways and Means Committee has consistently worried about
imposing high oil costs on home heating bills. This reluctance was
reflected in the amendment to COET to provide that certain home
heaters could obtain COET refunds in proportion to their purchases,
which is an expensive way of retaining price control. The root of this
amendment was the concern that coal heating of homes is no longer
feasible, which with a natural gas shortage leaves home heaters with
few alternatives (lower temperatures or more insulation). This problem was seen as peculiar to northern states. The regional nature of
the problem adds to the voter recognition of the issue. The vote
alignment supporting this rebate was substantially the same as that
supporting COET, except two Republicans, from Northern New
York and Pennsylvania, shifted to vote for rebate and one southern
2
Democrat shifted to vote against it. 4
After a decision to leave home heating systems facing too low a
price of oil (and gas) it was predictable that consumers would do too
little insulation, and too little investment in alternatives. It was,
therefore, obvious to induce economic behavior by introducing subsidies for home insulation and solar heat. Arguably solar heating
would be advanced more readily by more research outlays rather
than by consumer subsidies for buying the present high-priced systems. The subsidy for insulation is limited in amount per taxpayer
and in the form of a credit; it is probably not appreciably worse than
any other subsidy that could have been proposed.
Users of petro-chemicals and operators of multi-residential and
commercial heating systems were left alone with the price decontrol.
24. TAX NOTES, July 4, 1977, at 3.
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Automobile drivers were handled gingerly. The political wisdom was
that a straight-out increase in the automobile tax was anathematic
after the crushing defeat of the Ways and Means Committee's gasoline tax proposal in 1975.25

The Administration opened up an ingenious approach toward
using price mechanisms to reduce gasoline consumption. Studies of
price elasticity of demand for gasoline reveal a low short term elasticity, about 0.2, and a long term elasticity that is considerably
higher.' 6 The obvious meaning of these figures is that higher gasoline
prices have little effect on driving habits, assuming consumers drive
the autos they already own. Given time, the rational response to
higher gasoline prices is to put more weight on gasoline economy in
choosing a new car. (The obvious reason why European cars are so
much smaller than American cars is the historically high levels of
2
gasoline taxes in Europe.)

7

This situation points to an obvious political strategy-taxation of
new car owners. Such discrimination would be impossible to administer at the gasoline pump, but it could be accomplished by collecting
in advance a gasoline tax on new car purchases (at a discount for
pre-payment) on the expected gasoline consumption over the life of
the car. A car driven 100,000 miles in ten years with a average of 20
miles per gallon will consume 5,000 gallons. At a 9 percent discount
rate, the value of a 1 cent/gallon tax will be, at the time of purchase,
$33. Similar calculations for a car of 15 miles per gallon yields a
purchase tax of $50 and for 30 miles per gallon, $22.
The roughly 20 gallons of gasoline refined out of a barrel of crude
accounts for about 55 percent of the value of product. Consequently, gasoline buyers could be faced with the equivalent of a
$1 /bbl higher price for crude by a tax of about 3 cents/gal. Assuming
we wanted to induce behavior consistent with a real cost of imports
$3 above the nominal import price, the appropriate scale of the new
car tax would be as follows:
Gasoline consumption

Tax

12 miles/gal
15 miles/gal
20 miles/gal

$500
400
300

30 miles/gal
35 miles/gal

200
173

25. See Brannon, Price and Incomes, supra note 18.
26. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE FUEL EFFICIENCY INCENTIVE TAX PROPOSAL: ITS IMPACT UPON THE FUTURE OF U.S. PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (July 1977).
27. N. GUYOL, ENERGY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF GEOGRAPHY 99 (1971).
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This scale represents the current value of an extra 9 cents/gal gasoline
tax.
This strategy is inherently attractive in that it avoids a relatively
pointless burden on drivers of existing cars. In this way, existing car
owners are like those who heat homes; they face no viable options,
and see the income transfer associated with high prices as both useless and burdensome. The observation that such a tax burden is not
politic as well reflects a fundamental rationality in the political
process.
Unfortunately, the apparent "way around" the bad politics of a
gasoline tax carries its own problems; a significant penalty on new
car sales. Assuming an average price of a new car at $5,000, an
average tax of $300, and a price elasticity of demand around 1.2, car
purchases would decline about 7 percent.
Pursuing the will-of-the-wisp of a weightless burden, the administration came up with a means to impose a differential burden on
gasoline consumption of new cars by making the tax high on low
gasoline mileage cars, zero on average cars and negative (i.e., a tax
credit) on gasoline economy cars. This is a way of refunding the car
tax to customers, while continuing a price differential for gasoline
economy and not significantly reducing car purchases. (From an
energy policy standpoint, reducing new car purchases would have
been sensible but impolitic.)
Fascinated with its discovery of weightless burdens, the Administration sought to push the technique very hard. The significance of
these proposals can be seen by comparing a zero revenue variant of
the 9 cent gasoline tax proposal with the President's proposal:
Gasoline
Consumption
12
15
20
30
35

mil/gal
mil/gal
mil/gal
mil/gal
mil/gal

9 cent gasoline tax
prepaid ad] to
zero revenue

CarterProposal
1980

200
100
0
(100)
(133)

666
333
0
(333)
(428)

This severe economic burden on varying gasoline mileage makes
little economic sense. It was in fact presented by the President in
terms of a lot of moralistic talk about "gas guzzlers." A station
wagon carrying 5 people may be much more fuel efficient than a
small car carrying one person. A straight out "real cost of gasoline"
basis for the auto tax could have avoided the anti-family aspect of a
punitive tax on station wagons. Another political defect of the Administration's plan was that foreign cars would be over-represented in
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the refund category. A study called for by the Senate Finance
Committee produced the estimate that the plan would reduce 1985
sales of U.S. and Canadian produced cars by 330,000 and increase
imports by 300,000.28
Ultimately, the fate of the fuel economy incentive tax was to be
reduced to a fairly trivial device to enforce some crude mileage regulation imposed on car producers. When the problem was seen by the
public as amenable to a regulatory solution, price burdens appeared
unproductive.
The remaining three classes of fuel users, all in large industry,
elicited only modest sympathy. Presumably the industries involved
would pass most of higher fuel prices on to customers. These industries would be left with the market price of crude, and progressively between 1978 and 1983 there would be imposed an extra
excise tax from $1.50 to $3.00/bbl on crude oil (and a similar tax on
natural gas). The details are unimportant so we comment only on
some broad features of industrial user treatment.
Public utilities were subjected to the lowest tax, presumably because of the continuing protest about electric rates. These are
sensitive because rates are set by politically appointed public utility
commissions. In industrial situations in which conversion to coal is
not feasible, the extra tax is also low, in line with the limited option
principle. Finally, large classes of industrial users, small and medium
sized firms, and the inevitable farmers were spared the industrial user
tax.
The other features of the industrial user tax were two tax rebates.
Firms paying the tax were to be allowed a full rebate for installation
of oil substitute equipment while all firms were to be allowed an
extra investment credit for installation of any of a broad range of
equipment to utilize new energy sources or to produce more economical use of energy.
Neither rebate feature was brilliantly designed. The refund of
excise tax involves a 100 percent offset of cost and would induce
much outright waste of useful capital. The investment credit fails on
the ground that the amount of the credit is a function of the amount
of capital cost, not of the relative energy efficiency. The problem is
basically one of disorganized political decision-making. The Administration could have designed a more efficient subsidy for energy
efficient new investment, but the constraint was that it had to be
worked into the same tax package as the industrial user excise tax,
28. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 26.
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and the subsidy had to be designed not on energy policy grounds but
on grounds of workability within the tax system.
CONCLUSION
The energy "crisis" is a political one. It mostly arises from the
combination of historical accidents that led to a national response of
price control. In some political circumstances, political leadership or
industry influence may have led to a more market oriented response.
In the politics of the 1970's in the U.S. a market solution was not
possible; price control was demanded. The problem for successive
administrations has been to find popular ways to modify the
price/profit control system so as to come closer to market results.

